From our Blog

A severe flaw was discovered in a library for on-chain verification of Merkle-Patricia-Trie proofs. Protocols using it to bridge operations to L2s could be misled into accepting wrong state proofs, entailing direct loss of funds.

A critical vulnerability in the f(x) Protocol allowed attackers to exploit nested flash loans and bypass access controls, enabling them to steal collateral from any user's positions.

ChainSecurity completes a limited security review of Java-Tron, the Client running Tron.

Although the protocol seems promising, it is a complex system with edge cases and details that need to be taken into account when integrating with EigenLayer. In this article, we will try to cover as many integration quirks as possible in order to help developers and auditors understand what can go wrong and why.

A Merkle Proof is a cryptographically authenticated data structure widely used to minimize on-chain data storage. For instance, a Merkle proof against a Merkle root can support airdrop claims from a smart contract. Similarly, a Merkle Patricia Trie proof can verify the existence of a key-value pair in Ethereum’s state Trie.